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Considering the debates on current backlashes against international law and the
international rule of law, the matter of a peaceful ocean governance has come
under pressure. This is due not least to the fact that states sharing this common
goal yet disagree on how to interpret (newly created) treaty law such as the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Although international law
is nowadays and especially in the western hemisphere associated with the ideal
of creating a more just and peaceful world, other voices increasingly consider it
predominantly an instrument of power to achieve political objectives.
Following Ranganathan’s contribution on the legal concept of Common Heritage
of Mankind (CMH) in The Battle for International Law, that history may play a
role in this perception of Western hegemony. In this short essay, I will explore
how one might methodically bridge the gap between the battles of the past
detailed by Ranganathan and different perspectives in international law today. My
argument is that such a reflection on methods is important, because the normative
struggles of the past and their intellectual frameworks are still likely to affect the
practice of international law today. These theoretical questions are not present
in Ranganathan’s text, addressing them, however, seems useful to integrate the
normative knowledge in the current debate.
New light on UNCLOS by comparative international law and global legal
history
In the 1970s to early 1990s, the so-called developed and developing states waged
an ideological battle along different lines over the ocean-space, its seabed, and
mineral resources. Yet, another battle over the concept of the Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) took place simultaneously. In the reviewed volume, it is stated that both
proved to be a ‘Pyrrhic victory for the third world’ (p. 24). In my reading, the success
story of achieving such a comprehensive treaty, also known as the ‘Constitution for
the Oceans’, ultimately resulted in a pushback for the New International Economic
Order (NIEO).
However, the developing countries saw the NIEO as an essential part of their
considerations for developing the concepts of the CMH as well as the EEZ. I will take
up Ranganathan’s and the editors’ battle metaphor and extend it in two respects with
regard to UNCLOS: First, I will look into the concepts of comparative international
law as well as global legal history and how both of them might help to shed a new
light on the lost legal thoughts during the negotiation process. In the second part,
I will propose that we should revisit the battle sites in order to reemphasize the
unrealized possibilities of a more equitable international law.
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The things we lost in battle: Searching for sunken legal thoughts in history
International law is increasingly confronted with the perceived phenomenon
of divergent interpretations of its legal texts. There are two common ways of
conceiving them, either as backlashes or as regional approaches, the latter has
found methodological expression in comparative international law. However, when
considering the law of the sea, a perspective that methodically combines its historical
development and the contemporary practice still seems rare. In understanding how
the current views of UNCLOS in international relations came about, though, history
seems to be a critical factor in some cases.
As Anthea Roberts et al. state: ‘[comparative international law is concerned with]
similarities and differences in how international law is understood, interpreted,
applied, and approached by different national and international actors.’ Or, as
Alejandro Rodiles recently put it, comparative international law ‘postulates that
this, in principle, universal body of law may actually be about many particular
versions of it’. While the discussion of comparative international law, which first
emerged in the 1980s in the course of the East-West conflict, had temporarily fallen
asleep with the so-called end of history, this theoretical field has been developing
all the more rapidly in recent years. Dealing with a multiplicity of perspectives,
comparative international law shows points of overlap with the approach in the
history of international law to speak not of the history of international law but of its
histories.
In her contribution, Ranganathan adopts a historical perspective that is in line
with the volume’s objective and provides a useful starting point for analyzing the
consequences of the negotiations for the present. For how narratives about this
battle are actually reflected in the various practices of UNCLOS today would also be
a question worth asking.
For quite some time now, the disciplines of comparative law and legal history have
been regarded – at least to a certain extent – as mutually beneficial. E.g., James
Gordley argues that comparative law needs legal history as ‘legal rules acquire
their structure over time’. While a historian who wants to research the ‘law of a
given time and place, […] would need a comparative approach to see which rules
are characteristic of it.’ In the present context, I propose that the emerging fields
of comparative international law and global legal history could develop similar
synergies, in examining the negotiation process of UNCLOS. Thomas Duve recently
suggested that global legal history should inter alia ask ‘for the mechanisms that
have caused what is called the globalisation of law and legal scholarship, and the
role of the latter in globalisation.’ He goes on to define global legal history as the
‘critical history of the production of multinormative knowledge, understood as a
process of distributed knowledge production through cultural translation, comprising
theory and practice, drawing on a wide range of sources, on a transnational scale,
with special attention for the dialectics of glocalisation.’ To recall the thoughts on
comparative international law of yet another contributor to the volume at hand, Martti
Koskenniemi pleaded in 2011:
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A serious comparative study of international law would contribute to that
same shift – to thinking of the world no longer in terms of what Hegel used
to call abstract universals but seeing all players as both universal and
particular at the same time, speaking a shared language but doing that
from their own, localizable standpoint. It would, to put it somewhat grandly,
contribute to the ideology critique of international law, and of the institutions
sustained by that professional vocabulary.
Setting sails: Revisiting the battle sites
The perspective of the battle for international law, suggested by the editors of
the volume, might serve as a critical juncture, a focal point from where to start
such a methodological endeavor. This is because international treaty negotiations
are likely to bring to the fore otherwise hidden layers of normative knowledge.
Additionally, Ingo Venzke argued that it might be helpful to think about international
law also in the terms of: ‘How could it have been otherwise?’ If we look at the battles
for UNCLOS, we can see that they were not concentrated on a single issue but
have to be seen in a broader context in which the NIEO took an important role.
Ranganathan successfully showed this in the case of the negotiation process of the
seabed and CHM. Another critical area would certainly be the negotiation process
for the EEZ concept. M.K. Nawaz even claimed in 1980: ‘Indeed, it constitutes
the most significant development in the law of the sea, since Hugo Grotius wrote
his celebrated brief on Mare Liberum.’ Although one must certainly be cautious in
identifying such revolutionary moments in history, EEZs now cover about 40 percent
of ocean space, and the developed countries have been fast to implement them –
after making sure that freedom of navigation would not be hindered for their navies.
The NIEO and TWAIL scholars, as e.g. Rama Puri pointed out for India in 1980,
were a driving force behind the EEZ-concept. Ironically, developed countries are
today by far its biggest beneficiaries. Moreover, looking at recent publications on
UNCLOS, the fact that developing countries have played such an important role in
the EEZs development with its underlying rationale of the NIEO, seems to have been
pushed into the background. In 1979 with the UNCLOS negotiations still underway,
Robert H. Manley referring to the newly independent states saw the opportunity at
hand that UNCLOS will ‘become worthy of the increasingly global perspective of the
period in which the proceedings are taking place.’ However, in March 1982, when
the UNCLOS negotiations came to a close, Bhupinder S. Chimni noted that the draft
convention ‘only secures the most vital interests of imperialism by giving them legal
imprimatur’, as Raganathan pointed out.
Revisiting these former battle sites of international law through a global legal
historical perspective with the question proposed by Venzke might serve two
purposes: First, to bring the unrealized possibilities of another international law back
to the surface. The engagement with international law through a global perspective
would mean to take into account the normative knowledge that ultimately brought
about the NIEO and can be expected to have still influence on the interpretations
of UNCLOS today. The global legal historical perspective on battles could also
be another piece in the mosaic of a more nuanced understanding of comparative
international law today. Second, thinking about international law in the metaphor of
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past battles could help to emphasize its power in the field of international relations,
just as it forces us not to lose sight of its long-term consequences for the people to
whom it applies.
Ranganathan and the editors have provided us with a useful map that allows us to
bring history back in, set sail and do further research on each of the destinations.
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